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I.

Introduction

In a speech given less than a year after the end of World
War II, Winston Churchill referred to a “special relationship
between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United
States.”1 This special relationship has engendered comparisons
between Congress and Parliament, the White House and
Downing Street, and the roles and personalities of the persons
who occupy the offices of the Presidency and Prime Minister.
Much ink has been spilled and oxygen consumed by academics,
politicians, and commentators comparing the two countries’
respective constitutional systems. However, an oft-overlooked
area of comparison is that between the Supreme Court of the
United States (SCOTUS) and the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom (UKSC). Created in 1789, following ratification of the
US Constitution and passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
SCOTUS is one of the few US political institutions older than
its British counterpart—the UKSC. That court was created by
the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA 2005) and started to
hear cases in October 2009—just eleven years ago.2
SCOTUS and the UKSC both occupy central roles in their
respective constitutional systems. Perhaps because of this, both
courts have attracted the critical attention of the media and
politicians. Most recently, for example, SCOTUS received
intense criticism following decisions concerning LGBTQ rights,
abortion rights, and immigration.3 Similarly, the UK Supreme
Court recently came under severe criticism for its handling of

1. Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister, The Sinews of Peace (Mar.
5, 1946) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/425C-78LF).
2. Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4 (Eng.), https://perma.cc/7Q6ZWBYH. Prior to the CRA 2005, the Supreme Court was contained within the
House of Lords. Confusingly, this meant that members of the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords could also sit as members of the legislative
branch. One of the reasons behind the creation of a Supreme Court was to
create a stricter separation of powers between the judiciary and the
legislature. For further information, see DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A SUPREME COURT FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2003,
CP 11/03.
3. For a recent review of the Supreme Court’s term, see Adam Liptak,
In a Term Full of Major Cases, the Supreme Court Tacked to the Center, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/A5LV-75BR (last updated Sept. 9,
2020).
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two cases relating to Britain’s controversial exit from the
European Union (Brexit).4
Both courts have been accused of broadening their roles
beyond traditional separation of powers boundaries. In 2019,
the UKSC became the center of political and media attention
when it heard the case of R (Miller) v. Prime Minister.5 The case
concerned the decision of the Prime Minister to “prorogue”
Parliament, that is, adjourn its deliberations, which in effect
would have helped run down the clock and achieve his stated
goal of securing Britain’s departure from the European Union
(EU) on October 31, 2019. The unanimous decision of an
eleven-member panel of the UKSC was that the decision of the
Prime Minister was “unlawful,” and the decision rendered “null
and of no effect.”6 The decision led Owen Boycott, legal affairs
correspondent of The Guardian, to conclude that the court had
become “confident in its role” and “an increasingly recognisable
feature of national life.”7 Beyond the areas of constitutional and
administrative law, the court has also demonstrated its
confidence in issuing a number of other judgments that overturn
long-held precedents or create new ones.8 In fact, the court’s
decision in Miller (No. 2) led to so much concern from the
Conservative government, that the Party issued a manifesto
during the December 2019 election to establish a “Constitution,
Democracy [and] Rights Commission” to look at “the

4. See R (Miller) v. SOS for Exiting the E.U. [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC
61 (appeal taken from EWHC (Admin)); R (Miller) v. Prime Minister [2019]
UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373 (appeal taken from EWHC (QB)). Throughout the
article, the authors will refer to the first Miller case as “Miller (No. 1)” and the
second case as “Miller (No. 2).”
5. [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373 (appeal taken from EWHC (QB)).
6. Id. at [69].
7. Owen Boycott, After 10 Years, the Supreme Court Is Confident in Its
Role, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2019, 9:52 AM), https://perma.cc/2HVR-ZSEP.
8. See, e.g., R v. Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, [2017] AC 387 (appeal taken from
EWCA (Crim)) (overturning the current law on joint enterprise); Ivey v.
Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67, [2018] AC 391 (appeal taken from
EWCA (Civ)) (amending the test for “dishonesty” in criminal cases involving
theft, fraud, etc.); Radmacher v. Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [2011] 1 AC 534
(appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)) (recognizing the binding nature of
pre-nuptial agreements in English and Welsh law for the first time).
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relationship between the Government, Parliament and the
Courts . . . .”9
And so it goes with SCOTUS, given its position as perhaps
the most famous court in the world. SCOTUS was described by
Alexander Bickel in 1986 as “the most extraordinarily powerful
court of law the world has ever known.”10 Over the ensuing three
decades since Bickel wrote this in his famous book,11 the Court
has continued to play a large role as the final arbiter of the
Constitution, with a wide, supervisory role over Congress, the
Executive Branch, and the states. As with Brexit, this role has
arguably expanded as pressing social, political, and economic
issues have increasingly relied on the Court for resolution. Take
several examples from the Court’s most recent term. In Bostock
v. Clayton County,12 SCOTUS ruled that the term “sex” used in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses the “gender
identity” of members of the LGBTQ community.13 In
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California,14 a majority held that the mechanism used by the
Trump Administration to shutter the DACA program violated
the Administrative Procedure Act.15 The final cases handed
down in the 2019–2020 term involved whether Manhattan
District Attorney Cyrus Vance could subpoena the president’s
tax returns and whether the House Judiciary Committee could
access the same information.16 A majority of the justices, in both
cases, rejected the Trump Administration’s argument of broad
immunity. In the future, the decisions in both cases will be

9. THE CONSERVATIVE & UNIONIST PARTY, THE CONSERVATIVE AND
UNIONIST PARTY MANIFESTO 2019: GET BREXIT DONE UNLEASH BRITAIN’S
POTENTIAL 48 (2019), https://perma.cc/3ZZ9-K4W5 (PDF).
10. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (2d ed. 1986).
11. Id.
12. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
13. Id. at 1737.
14. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
15. Id. at 1901.
16. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,
140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
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studied as landmark cases on presidential power.17 This is all in
just one term.
This Article will compare SCOTUS and the UKSC in
several dimensions. Part II addresses the appointment
processes and the membership of the courts, setting the stage
for a comparison of the extent politics enters the process and its
impact on the courts’ powers. Part III then analyses the powers
of each of the courts, and the role of each court within its
respective constitutional structure. Part IV analyzes the
respective method of statutory/constitutional interpretation
employed by each of the courts and how these approaches differ.
Finally, Part V discusses the growing independence of the courts
in resolving social and political controversies, the future of that
expanding role, and the impact of that role on the courts’
legitimacy.
This Article concludes that SCOTUS remains a much more
powerful court than its UK counterpart, a relatively young court
whose powers are evolving. However, the UKSC appears to be
catching up to SCOTUS in terms of its ability to act as a
constitutional court and its ability to be the sole arbiter of
constitutional matters. It is also becoming more willing to
depart from precedent, issue rulings that are unfriendly to the
government of the day, and exercise powers to the very limit of
its boundaries. By doing so, the UKSC is becoming more like
SCOTUS. This naturally has far-reaching and profound
consequences for the separation of powers within the United
Kingdom. At the same time, SCOTUS continues to assume a
larger role in limiting the executive and legislative branches.
Both courts face an uncertain future in which their roles in
their constitutional systems will come under intense scrutiny
and pressure. The tension between the rule of law and the
sovereignty of the elected branches is palpable. Indeed, this is
part of an international trend; in a time of political leaders who
seemingly are pushing the limits of the rule of law, this tension
will only become more acute. By way of conclusion, this Article
will consider what lessons each of the courts can learn from each
other as they must tread a delicate line between preserving the
17. See Benjamin Weiser & William K. Rashbaum, Trump Must Turn
Over Tax Returns to D.A., Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2020), https://
perma.cc/66SP-GKH7 (last updated Nov. 4, 2020).
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rule of law and usurping the role of elected representatives. How
each will respond may have a profound impact on their
respective roles, on the courts’ perceived legitimacy, and on the
separation of powers in Washington, D.C. and Westminster.
II.

Appointment and Nomination Processes

A.

The Supreme Court of the United States

The US Constitution gives the president the power to
“appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court” with the “advice and
consent of the Senate.”18 The president nominates a justice of
the Supreme Court and the Senate makes the ultimate decision
as to whether that individual is confirmed. As has been widely
recognized, to say that this clause is “ambiguous” is an
understatement.19
A clearer understanding can be ascertained by looking at
the early historical context in which this phrase was created.
When the Constitution was drafted, the primary purpose of
creating a joint effort of the president and the Senate was to
present a check on the power of the president. To Alexander
Hamilton, the Senate “[w]ould be an excellent check upon a
spirit of favouritism in the president and would tend greatly to
prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State
prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or
from a view to popularity.”20 The idea of requiring the Senate’s
“advice and consent” in the selection of Supreme Court
nominees was only a late addition at the Constitutional
Convention.21 Yet, as history shows, the idea that the Senate
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19. See James E. Gauch, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme
Court Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 339 (1989) (explaining how the
Judicial Clause in the US Constitution is vague and ambiguous).
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 385 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2009).
21. See Eric T. Kaspar, The Politics of Rejection: The Framers’
Constitutional Design for Supreme Court Appointments, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV.
539 (2018) (providing an abridged version of the Philadelphia Convention); see
also David R. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and
the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1494–96 (1991) (providing a
history of how specific terms were added to the US Constitution, specifically
Article II).
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would be a rubber stamp or overly deferential to presidential
nominees was disproven in the early years of the Republic. In
the summer of 1795, George Washington made the recess
appointment of Justice John Rutledge to succeed John Jay as
chief justice. Rutledge’s nomination ultimately was rejected by
the Senate, with Rutledge resigning from the Court shortly
thereafter. Moreover, during its first 105-year history, the
Senate did not merely serve as a rubber stamp for presidential
appointments, but in fact rejected twenty out of the eighty-one
presidential nominees (including Rutledge).22 In more recent
times, this may be shifting. Since 1980, only one SCOTUS
nominee has been rejected by the full Senate: this was Robert
Bork in 1987.23 On the other hand, the knowledge that the
Senate will not rubberstamp a presidential nominee may have
resulted in other nominees withdrawing their nominations
rather than face potential rejection from the Senate.24
The president and Senate are both elected, of course. Given
that fact, it is hardly surprising that politics looms large over
the appointment process. The influence of politics has
manifested itself in a number of ways. The first is in the
selection of nominees by the president. When considering whom
to nominate, presidents consider several factors. These can be
superficial—such as age, gender, political affiliation, and the
race of the nominee. For example, a recent biography of Sandra
Day O’Connor contends that Ronald Reagan had been keen to
nominate (and confirm) the first female Supreme Court

22. Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1202 (1988). Perhaps President John Tyler occupies an
ignominious footnote in US history; of the six nominees he named and sent to
the Senate, only one was ultimately confirmed.
23. Linda Greenhouse, Bork’s Nomination Is Rejected, 58–42; Reagan
Saddened, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 1987), https://perma.cc/QKL5-7CSW.
24. Nominated in the wake of Bork’s rejection, Douglas Ginsburg
withdrew his own candidacy before even reaching the Senate after his use of
illegal drugs came to light. Steven V. Roberts, Ginsburg Withdraws Name as
Supreme Court Nominee, Citing Marijuana Clamour, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8,
1987), https://perma.cc/6V8S-YS7B. For different reasons, Harriet Miers,
nominated by President George W. Bush to succeed Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, withdrew her own nomination after receiving criticism from both
Republicans and Democrats. Timothy Williams, Miers Withdraws Her
Nomination, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2005), https://perma.cc/Y9XV-5QX5.
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justice.25 Similarly, President Clinton told a confidante that he
wanted to be the first person to nominate a Hispanic candidate
to the bench (which he ultimately did not do).26 Clinton was also
eager to nominate a governor to the Court, with New York
Governor Mario Cuomo being on the final shortlist of candidates
to both vacancies that Clinton would ultimately fill.27
Beyond the superficial characteristics of potential
nominees, presidents and their administrations consider the
legal philosophies of potential Supreme Court nominees. Some
even argue that the process for the White House is based
largely, if not entirely, on whether a nominee supports a
president’s political agenda.28 It would be all too simple, and
perhaps improper, for judicial nominees to come out with bold,
unequivocal phrases such as, “If nominated I will
overturn/uphold Roe v. Wade.” However, while convention
requires that they refrain from commenting on certain
contentious issues that they could face as a justice of the Court,
these political issues may ultimately dictate who gets selected
by a president. Take, for example, statements made by
then-presidential candidate Donald Trump. During a
presidential debate in 2016, he stated that he was a “pro-life
candidate” and would appoint “pro-life judges” if he was elected
to the White House.29 Indeed, when President Trump selected
three nominees, Justice Neil Gorsuch, Justice Brett Kavanaugh,
and Justice Amy Coney Barrett, their pro-life positions were
key.
These considerations have extended to Democratic
administrations as well. President Obama’s ultimate
nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to succeed Justice David Souter
is a good example. Jeffrey Toobin has reported that Denise Wood
(a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals) came under
25. EVAN THOMAS, FIRST: SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 122–23 (2019).
26. TAYLOR BRANCH, THE CLINTON TAPES: A PRESIDENT’S SECRET DIARY
149–50 (2010).
27. Id. at 42–43. According to Branch, Bruce Babbitt (Governor of
Arizona) also made the shortlist for Clinton’s first appointment (who would
eventually be Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
28. Monaghan, supra note 22, at 1205.
29. Dan Mangan, Trump: I’ll Appoint Supreme Court Justices to Overturn
Roe v. Wade Abortion Case, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2016, 9:31 PM), https://perma.cc
/6ZUY-5YQV (last updated Oct. 19, 2016, 10:00 PM).
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However,
serious
consideration
for
this
vacancy.30
administration figures believed that her position on abortion
and the fact that her decisions on abortion had been overruled
by the Supreme Court were insurmountable negatives.31
President Obama thought that “the benefits of appointing her
(Wood) were, from a political perspective, unclear.”32
After being named by the president and, hopefully,
surviving the media’s glare (something that Douglas Ginsburg
and Harriet Miers were unable to do), the nominee then moves
to the Senate for consideration. How much of a role the Senate
plays in the process has been subject to intense debate among
scholars. Some argue that the founders envisioned an
“energetic” Senate role in the process.33 Others contend that
while the Senate has an important role, its ultimate role is
merely to guard against the appointment of “nominees
perceived to be morally unworthy or too radical.”34 Another view
is the “deferential” view—that the Senate’s role is to determine
whether the ideology of a nominee falls within a “main broad
stream.”34 Yet it is difficult to find wider support for this latter,
minimalist or deferential view of the Senate’s role. Alexander
Hamilton argued that one of the functions of the Senate is
“restraining” the president.35 Perhaps the prevailing view is
best described as a “realist” role: when making a selection, the
president must consider whether his nominee has a realistic
chance of clearing the Senate.
The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings are the subject
of much focus by academics, journalists, legal practitioners, and
the media.36 Supreme Court hearings in the Senate Judiciary
Committee have become national (and international) spectacles;
30. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 130 (2012).
31. Id. at 131 (detailing how a Supreme Court justice candidate’s ruling
on a controversial political issue affected her consideration for the bench).
32. Id.
33. Kaspar, supra note 21, at 568.
34. Monaghan, supra note 22, at 1203; see id. at 1210 (contending that
the Senate is a “poor judge of judicial philosophy”).
35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 387 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2009).
36. However, for the purposes of this article, discussion will be limited to
the role of the Senate, rather than the specific mechanics of the hearing.
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they are covered widely, often live on national network
television, and receive extensive coverage on cable news.37 Apart
from increasing viewership and civic engagement, it is hard to
envisage what the public hearings actually achieve. The
nominees reveal virtually nothing about themselves, their
positions, or their view of the judicial role. David Strauss and
Cass Sunstein, writing in the wake of the Clarence Thomas
hearings, wrote that the process “amounts to a media event
unedifying for the public, undignified for the country, and
unlikely to produce outstanding Justices or an outstanding
Court.”38
It is hard to disagree with this sentiment. Clarence Thomas
seemingly spent more time discussing the allegations against
him by Anita Hill than he did discussing his approach to stare
decisis. Justice Kavanaugh’s hearings will be remembered most,
not for his approach to Roe v. Wade39 or to Constitutional
Interpretation, but for the spectacle of the discussion of
allegations of sexual misconduct against him.40 As one
commentator has noted, nominees have generally stuck to the
same script, which is “to say nothing, say it at great length, and
then say it again.”41 Then-Judge Antonin Scalia offered an in
extremis interpretation of this practice. During his confirmation,
Scalia refused to answer a question about the Court’s decision
two centuries before in Marbury v. Madison.42 And witness
Justice Barrett’s recent appearance, when she indicated she did
37. Mary Clark, for example, argues that the role of the Senate has
“evolved substantially over time” and she points to growing propensity of
nominees to pay “courtesy calls” to members of the Senate. Mary L. Clark,
Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting Roles of the
Legislature in U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L. REV. 451,
467 – 68 (2001).
38. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1492.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, Brett Kavanaugh and
Christine Blasey Ford Duel with Tears and Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://perma.cc/Z4GV-RLW7.
41. Adam Liptak, Brett Kavanaugh’s Expert Evasions: Learned from Past
Masters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/E56H-XHMV.
42. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 33–34 (1986) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia).
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not know anything about climate change and other equally
public and important social issues.
In sum, the term “advice and consent” has created a process
that is inherently political, with politics dictating who the
president nominates and whether or not senators will
ultimately vote their approval.43 The Barrett appointment,
rushed through after President Trump admitted he wanted her
to be present to vote on cases surrounding his own upcoming
election,44 is the most recent and perhaps extreme example. In
addition to its impact on the legitimacy of the Court, the process
has become so political that selection of Supreme Court
nominees now occupies a central, sometimes decisive, role in
presidential and Senate elections.
B.

The UK Supreme Court

The nomination process to the UK Supreme Court is a much
less controversial and politicized process than the US process
described above, and much less of a public spectacle. This is due,
of course, in part to the cultural differences between the two
countries. But it also reflects the process itself. Rather than
being set forth in vague constitutional text, the way in which
Supreme Court justices are appointed is defined in almost
painstaking detail by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.45 The
first appointees to the UKSC were those who held positions on
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, the UKSC’s
43. For example, consider the remarks made by then-Senator Obama
when President George W. Bush named Samuel Alito to fill the vacancy left
by Justice O’Connor:
Though I will reserve judgment on how I will vote on Judge Alito’s
nomination until after the hearings, I am concerned that President
Bush has wasted an opportunity to appoint a consensus nominee in
the mold of Sandra Day O’Connor and has instead made a selection
to appease the far right-wing of the Republican Party.
Press Release, Senator Barack Obama, Obama Statement on President Bush’s
Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court (Oct. 31, 2005),
https://perma.cc/7SHF-KRAS.
44. David Jackson & Joey Garrison, Trump Says He Wants to Fll
Supreme Court Seat Quickly in Case Justices Need to Settle Election Dispute,
USA TODAY (Sep. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/3PTD-ZCM2.
45. Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4 (Eng.), https://perma.cc/7Q6ZWBYH. Parts of the CRA 2005 have been amended by the Crime and Courts
Act 2013, c. 22 (Eng.), https://perma.cc/399A-2R6M.
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predecessor. Its first president was then-Senior Lord of Appeal,
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers.46 The CRA 2005 ushered in a
new era of judicial appointments in the UK. The new system
replaced the so-called “taps on the shoulder” from the Lord
Chancellor with the Judicial Appointments Commission
(JAC).47
When a vacancy arises on the Supreme Court, the Lord
Chancellor, working with the president of the Supreme Court,
creates an ad-hoc selection panel.48 The president of the
Supreme Court chairs the panel. Another member will be a
senior judge from the United Kingdom who is not a member of
the Supreme Court.49 Vacancies are posted online and are akin
to most public and private sector recruitment notices.50
Ironically, for a position of profound constitutional importance,
46. Constitutional Reform Act § 24(b).
47. Clark, supra note 37, at 473; see Constitutional Reform Act § 61(1).
48. The Lord Chancellor’s role is among the oldest positions of the UK
government. The Lord Chancellor, for much of English history, was a member
of all three branches of government. The Lord Chancellor sat as a member of
the Cabinet (Executive), a member of the House of Lords (Legislature), and as
a member of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (Judiciary). One
of the ideas driving the CRA 2005 was the need to reform the position of the
Lord Chancellor and especially how it relates to the independence of the
judiciary. For a discussion of the position in the 21st century, see Graham Gee,
What are Lord Chancellors For?, 2017 PUB. L. 11; Patrick O’Brien, “Enemies
of the People”: Judges, the Media, and the Mythic Lord Chancellor, 2017 PUB.
L. 135.
49. For example, the UK Supreme Court is currently recruiting a
replacement for Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore. On the panel to recruit his
replacement is the president of the Supreme Court (Lord Reed of Allermuir),
the chief justice of Northern Ireland (Sir Declan Morgan), and three other
individuals who are members of the Judicial Appointments Commission for
England and Wales, the JAC for Northern Ireland, and the Judicial
Appointments Board for Scotland. Selection Process for Supreme Court Justice
Launched, U.K. SUP. CT. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/EFD9-VGST. There
is a detailed process set out in diagrammatic form on the Supreme Court’s
website. See generally Judicial Vacancies: Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom, U.K. SUP. CT., https://perma.cc/448J-7T6L.
50. Vacancies are also listed in national newspapers and more bespoke
publications. February 2019 saw the launch of the recruitment for three new
justices after the pending retirements of Lady Hale, Lord Carnwarth, and
Lord Wilson in the first half of 2020. For an example of the announcements
made when the justices retired, see Supreme Court Selection Process for
President and Justices, U.K. SUP. CT. (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/Z8CDGLW8.
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the job description and information pack are what one would
expect for senior positions across the public and private
sectors.51 The members of the panel must include
(a) at least one who is non-legally-qualified, (b) at least one
judge of the Court, (c) at least one member of the Judicial
Appointments Commission, (d) at least one member of the
Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, and (e) at least
one member of the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments
Commission, and more than one of the requirements may be
met by the same person’s membership of the commission.52

One of the intended effects of the legislation was to open the
judicial appointments process to legal practitioners who were
not already judges.53 However, in the court’s first decade just
two non-judges have been appointed. The first was Jonathan
Sumption appointed in 2011 and the second was Prof. Andrew
Burrows, who became a justice in June 2020.54 Sumption was a
noted Queen’s Counsel (QC) who had been instructed in a
number of high-profile cases including the Baker Report on the
Iraq War and on behalf of the Russian billionaire Roman
Abramovich in a claim against Boris Berozovsky in a contract
law dispute.55 Burrows, on the other hand, was a noted
academic who had held a highly prestigious tenured position at

51. For further reading, see U.K. SUP. CT., INFORMATION PACK: VACANCY
FOR APPOINTMENT AS A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT (2020), https://perma.cc

/26SU-MJJN (PDF). The information pack is for candidates who are interested
in replacing Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore; as Lord Kerr is a judge who previously
practiced law in Northern Ireland, the position is only open to those with
similar experience. Id. at 2.
52. Crime and Courts Act, sch. 13 ¶ 4(1). The chair of the selection panel
(usually the president of the court) and Lord Chancellor must consider
diversity as a factor for appointment. See Constitutional Reform Act § 137A.
53. A.W. BRADLEY, K.D. EWING & C.J.S. KNIGHT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 331–33 (17th ed. 2018).
54. Clive Colman, Jonathan Sumption QC Appointed Supreme Court
Judge, BBC (May 4, 2011), https://perma.cc/GWQ9-UYBD. Sumption was once
described as having “a brain the size of a planet” and is also a notable scholar
of the Hundred Years War. Id.
55. Id. A Queen’s Counsel is typically a senior barrister who has practiced
for a decade or more. Aside from having “QC” after one’s name, a QC is a senior
barrister and the appointment is a hallmark of their quality as an advocate.
Readers in the United States who, rightly, may be baffled by the various
terminology can find a useful primer in EMILY ALLBON & SANMEET KAUR DUA,
ELLIOTT & QUINN’S LEGAL SYSTEM 216–39 (20th ed. 2019).
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the University of Oxford.56 His expertise was mainly in
commercial law, with his work regularly cited in commercial
cases by both the Court of Appeal and his now-colleagues on the
UK Supreme Court. At the time of this writing, all other
appointees since 2009 have been Court of Appeal judges (or their
equivalent in Scotland and Northern Ireland).57
The role and membership provisions of the JAC and the
CRA 2005 were both amended by the Crime and Courts Act
2013 (CCA 2013).58 The first salient provision of CCA 2013 is
that the number of justices is capped at 12. The only stipulation
is that an odd number of justices should be selected for each
weekly court sitting.59 It is up to the president and deputy
president of the court to allocate the panel size for each case and
the workload of the justices.60 Typically, the court sits as a
larger group when the case involves an issue of particularly high
legal importance. The maximum panel size is eleven and the
court has only sat in this formation on two occasions. These were
both of the Miller cases, the first of which dealt with the
government’s decision to invoke Article 50 of the Treaty on
European Union (TEU)61 to trigger Brexit negotiations and the

56. Prof. Andrew Burrows Appointed to the Supreme Court, UNIV. OF
OXFORD FAC. OF LAW (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/TCK9-NF46.
57. Due to the nature of the history of the UK, each of the nations that
make up the UK have their own separate legal systems (except for England
and Wales). The next highest court to the UKSC in England and Wales is the
Court of Appeal; in Scotland it is the Court of Session; and in Northern
Ireland, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. Since the Supreme Court’s
inception in 2009, there have been two Scottish justices (currently these are
Lord Reed and Lord Hodge) and one Northern Irish judge (Lord Kerr). Lord
Reed, Lord Hodge, and Lord Kerr were all judges at the court of appeal level
in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The remaining appointees (aside from Lord
Sumption and Lord Burrows) were all justices of the England and Wales Court
of Appeal.
58. Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22 (Eng.), https://perma.cc/399A2R6M.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. (C
326) art. 50.
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second of which dealt with the Prime Minister’s decision to
prorogue Parliament.62
If the total number of justices is expected to fall below
twelve, due either to retirement, death, or resignation, a
selection panel is convened.63 Once the panel has reached a
decision on the individual whom it wishes to appoint, the Lord
Chancellor can either appoint the nominee, ask the panel to
reconsider its recommendation, or reject the nominee
altogether.64 So far all nominees have been accepted by the Lord
Chancellor, so that one can only imagine that they would be
rejected in only the most exceptional circumstances.
Given the importance of Parliament in the United Kingdom
and the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, the involvement
of Parliament in the selection process is conspicuous by its
absence.65 Unlike in the United States, legislators—members of
the House of Commons and House of Lords—do not have a direct
or even an indirect say in who serves on the Supreme Court. The
reason given for excluding parliamentary involvement is that it
threatens to upset the delicate balance of the UK’s separation of
powers.66 Commentators point to the role of the judiciary in
mediating disputes between the Government and individuals,
groups, and organizations.67 A central tenet of the rule of law is
the notion that judges are independent of other branches.68 The
essence of the UK Constitution is that the government is drawn
62. R (Miller) v. Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373 (appeal
taken from EWHC (QB)); R (Miller) v. SOS for Exiting the E.U. [2017] UKSC
5, [2018] AC 61 (appeal taken from EWHC (Admin)).
63. Lord Dyson is the only Supreme Court justice to have resigned to take
up a different judicial position. He resigned from the court in 2012 to take up
the position of master of the rolls and head of civil justice.
64. The Supreme Court (Judicial Appointments) Regulations 2013, SI
2013/2193, art. 20 (Eng.).
65. For a further discussion on Parliamentary Sovereignty, see infra Part
III.B.
66. The United Kingdom does not have the same, strict separation of
powers as in the United States. For the best primer on the separation of
powers in the United States, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 263 (James
Madison) (Ian Shapiro et al., ed., 2009). Compare that to the United Kingdom.
See BRADLEY, EWING & KNIGHT, supra note 53, at 96–102.
67. See, e.g., WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 17 (11th ed. 2014).
68. Id. at 16.
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directly from Parliament, with the Prime Minister being the
leader of the party who commands a majority of support in the
House of Commons.69 Relying on elected officials to select
Supreme Court justices, as in the United States, would have
profound consequences for the legitimacy and independence of
the judiciary, and for the separation of powers generally.
The UK selection process has been sharply criticized for two
reasons. One leading commentator argues that “the democratic
deficit in the selection process of an increasingly powerful
Supreme Court has deepened at a time when there is growing
expectation of electoral accountability amongst political
decision-makers.”70 The democratic deficit referred to has two
components that challenge the court’s legitimacy: (1) how the
justices are selected and the powers that they exercise and (2)
the narrow social background from which UK judges are
drawn.71 There is much to these arguments. Parliament, and the
House of Commons specifically, is the representative body in the
Constitution. Parliament’s power is drawn from the electorate,
providing a mandate to make controversial decisions and
accountability to the electorate. Judges, on the other hand,
cannot lay claim to either such a mandate or such public
accountability.
This supposed “lack of legitimacy” line of argument has
itself been challenged. One scholar takes the position that the
Supreme Court is morphing into an independently legitimate
constitutional court that interprets and develops fundamental
principles of constitutional law.72 As such, the justices are
themselves legitimate and representative, drawing their
legitimacy as being “representational organs” of law.73 This
argument finds some support from the justices themselves. Lord
Neuberger, while president of the court, contended that the
justices’ detachment from an electorate affords judges the

69. The House of Commons is the British equivalent of the House of
Representatives.
70. Kate Malleson, The Evolving Role of the Supreme Court, 2011 PUB. L.
754, 769.
71. Id. at 754.
72. Jo Eric Kushal Murkens, Judicious Review: The Constitutional
Practice of the UK Supreme Court, 77 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 349, 350 (2018).
73. Id. at 363.
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opportunity to provide guidance on certain potentially
too-controversial topics.74
This view of the Supreme Court as independent does not
take away from the idea that Parliament is the representational
body within the UK constitution. There is, nonetheless, a
reticence among practitioners, politicians, and academics to
introduce US-style parliamentary hearings. One of the reasons
for this is the “revulsion at the Senate process” among the UK’s
political and legal establishment and the concern that such
hearings would lead to politicization of the judiciary.75 However,
as will be discussed, the increasingly powerful role that the
UKSC is playing within the separation of powers and the
increased calls for parliamentary involvement may only grow
louder as the Supreme Court wields more power and is
increasingly challenging both the executive and the legislative
branches on a wide range of policy issues. Without drawing
legitimacy from Parliament (Congress’s UK counterpart) or
being directly elected, some argue that the powers being wielded
by the UK Supreme Court either need to be reined in or
Parliament should have a greater say in who sits as a justice.
III. The Role and Powers of the Courts in their Respective
Constitutional Systems
A.

The Supreme Court of the United States

Unlike the situation in the United Kingdom, where there is
no written constitution, the United States has a written
Constitution, commentaries on the drafting of that Constitution
by the Founding Fathers at the Philadelphia Convention, and
the Federalist Papers. It therefore is able to rely on a series of
written documents to help deduce the original intent of the
Framers with respect to the powers of the Supreme Court.
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution enumerates that “the
74. R (Nicklinson) v. Ministry of Just. [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] AC 657
[104] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
75. Clark, supra note 37, at 485–86. Clark points to the confirmation
process of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas as one of the reasons why
Parliamentary involvement has not been entertained. Any concern, one
imagines, will have grown more acute in the wake of the hearings to confirm
Justice Brett Kavanaugh and Justice Amy Coney Barrett.
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judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”76
The powers of the Court are addressed in Article III, Section
2, which provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another
State; between Citizens of different States, between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.77

With respect to the scope of the Supreme Court’s review
powers, Alexander Bickel, looking at the records of the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, argues that the
Founding Fathers were “inviting judicial review.”78 However,
Constitutional text alone does not provide a sufficient basis for
understanding the scope of the Supreme Court’s review.
The seminal case of Marbury v. Madison provides the best
judicial interpretation of the role of the Supreme Court.79 The
decision has been called “our foremost symbol of judicial
power.”80 It has also been argued that the decision is the
ultimate symbol of the notion that the constitution is a limiting
document: “[t]hus did Marshall assume for his court what is
nowhere made explicitly in the Constitution the ultimate power
to apply the Constitution, acts of contrary notwithstanding.”81
It is hard to disagree with the notion that Marbury is an
important decision. The decision builds upon the rather vague
text of Article III and establishes the judicial branch,
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
77. Id. § 2.
78. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 11–16.
79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
80. Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great
Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 481 (2004).
81. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 3.
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specifically the Supreme Court, as the ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution so that when a statute/executive action is contrary
to the Constitution, it is the Constitution that prevails. This
interpretation finds support from Justice Scalia, who argued
that Marbury was “lawyer’s work” and that “when the
Constitution is at issue, the Constitution prevails because it is
a ‘super statute.’”82
As then-Chief Justice Marshall wrote unequivocally, “[i]t is
emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is . . . . If two laws conflict with
each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each.”83
Chief Justice Marshall continued that the idea that any laws
were superior to the Constitution would “subvert the very
foundation of all written constitutions.”84 It has been observed
that this notion is one of the reasons why the “least dangerous
branch” has become one of the most powerful branches among
the federal government.85
At the same time, it has been argued that this position
places too much emphasis on Marbury as the foundation on
which judicial power and judicial review are based. The decision
has been called one of “great statesmanship, not great
theorizing.”86 One can also look for guidance at Alexander
Hamilton’s thoughts about the Supreme Court, which are so
cogently explained in the Federalist Papers.87 Federalist 78,
which predated Marbury v. Madison by over a decade, provides
perhaps the clearest statement of the Founders’ vision for the
judiciary. When discussing the need for life tenure for Supreme
Court justices, Hamilton argued that “[i]n a monarchy it is an
excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it
82. Antonin G. Scalia, Assoc. Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Constitutional
Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way (Mar. 14, 2005) (transcript available at
https://perma.cc/57BG-67XG (PDF)).
83. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
84. Id. at 178.
85. Harry F. Tepker, Marbury’s Legacy of Judicial Review After Two
Centuries, 57 OKLA. L. REV 127, 136 (2004).
86. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of
Constitutional Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2003).
87. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78–82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009).
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is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body.”88 In discussing these
“encroachments and oppressions,” Hamilton is surely pointing
to the potential of congressional legislation or executive action
to contravene the provisions of the Constitution. He develops
this argument further:
No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution,
can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy
is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his
master; that the representatives of the people are superior to
the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers,
may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but
what they forbid.89

In terms of who decides on the meaning of the Constitution,
Hamilton argues:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be
regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body.90

These statements are crystal clear on the surface; there is no
linguistic or semantic uncertainty. Thus, Marbury did little else
but confirm what Hamilton had written in 1788.91
Why then did it take a further fifteen years for this vision
to be realized by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury? To answer
this one must return to the earlier description of the decision as
one of “great statesmanship, not great theorizing.”92 Marshall,
in a model that future chief justices would follow, was sensitive
to the institutional position of the Supreme Court vis-à-vis the

88. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2009).
89. Id. at 393.
90. Id. at 394.
91. The authors are no lexicographers; however, if one compares the
above two quotations with that quoted at supra note 35, the phraseology is
almost identical.
92. Eisgruber, supra note 86, at 1204.
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other branches.93 In Marbury, a case involving the appointment
power of the president under Article II and the changing politics
of the Jeffersonian Era, Marshall was clear to avoid a
confrontation with the incoming Jefferson administration and
the potential resulting institutional fallout for the Supreme
Court. This viewpoint is supported by others.94 It also has been
pointed out that during the Colonial Era, judges were viewed
with suspicion because they were viewed as “appendages or
extensions of royal authority.”95 While Marshall interpreted
Article III in the same way as Hamilton, one can understand
Marshall’s need for a more cautious interpretation that was
sensitive to the institutional position of the Supreme Court
within the US separation of powers. Marshall seemingly had a
strategy of “less is more.”96 Marbury was and remains an
important decision; institutions often need a marker to
demarcate a departure point and for the Supreme Court,
Marbury offers this. Without Marbury, the Court might not
have the basis for wielding the extraordinary powers that it does
today.
What then is the legacy of Marbury and how has it impacted
the role of the Supreme Court? The major legacy is the ability of
SCOTUS to be the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution. Given

93. This is perhaps one of the oft-overlooked legacies of the Marbury
decision and one can see the impact of this throughout US history. Most
recently one can look at Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); his decision to join
the four “liberal” justices to uphold vast portions of the Affordable Care Act
perhaps best exemplifies Marbury’s legacy. At the end of his opinion (the
opinion of the court), Roberts writes that “the Framers created a Federal
Government of limited powers and assigned to this Court the duty of enforcing
those limits. The Court does so today. But the Court does not express any
opinion on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution,
that judgment is reserved to the people.” Id. at 588. This statement denotes
the importance of the institution of the court to Roberts within the separation
of powers. Toobin’s account of the deliberations seems to suggest that Roberts
vacillated on what the final decision would be, to the point that Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion was first written as a dissent, then transformed into a
concurring opinion. See TOOBIN, supra note 30, at 280–98.
94. Eisgruber, supra note 86, at 1210.
95. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review, Or How the
Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 790
(1999).
96. Id. at 805.
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the codified nature of the US Constitution, especially the
addition of the Bill of Rights (and subsequent amendments),
this line in the sand gave SCOTUS wide-ranging powers,
especially over the other branches of government. This legacy
has manifested itself a number of times, but perhaps the most
striking one is the role SCOTUS played during the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to give African
Americans the rights enshrined in the 14th and 15th
Amendments of the Constitution.97 Similarly, from the 1970s
onwards, Supreme Court litigation has been used across the
political spectrum to achieve social and political goals.98
Another legacy of Marbury is the central role that the
Supreme Court plays within the political and constitutional
system. Marbury helped to confirm the role of the Supreme
Court as an “umpire” among the different branches.99 The
history of the United States is filled with seminal cases whereby
the Supreme Court acted as an umpire in disputes between the
various different branches. For example, in United States v.
Nixon,100 the Court unanimously ruled that President Nixon
was required to turn over tapes of Oval Office meetings to the
White House special prosecutor.101 Just over two decades later,
it would similarly rule unanimously that a sitting president is

97. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (detailing
how the US Supreme Court’s decisions on civil rights cases led to progress
towards equal rights for African Americans).
98. Conservative campaigners have used the Supreme Court to expand
key political objectives. For example, the court has interpreted the Second
Amendment to include a personal right to own guns. See District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 582 (2008). Liberal campaigners have used litigation
to advance LGBTQ rights. Since 2000, the court has issued two rulings which
have been transformative for the LGBTQ community within the United
States. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court held that
legislation that criminalized homosexuality was unconstitutional, id. at 567,
and in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), it held that same-sex couples
had a right to marry under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, id.
at 665.
99. Transcript: Roberts’s Opening Statement Before Senate Panel, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2005), https://perma.cc/9A2F-S8Q9.
100. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
101. See id. at 713–14.
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not immune from civil law proceedings in a federal court while
in office.102
Marbury established the Supreme Court as the final arbiter
of all matters related to the Constitution. Over the two centuries
since the decision, the Court has taken on Marshall’s notion that
“[i]t is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”103 Marshall’s notion that it
is for the Supreme Court to “say what the law is” is central to
how the Supreme Court wields its power, because how any
court, let alone a constitutional or apex court, interprets law and
constitutions is ultimately how its power and influence is
wielded.
B.

The UK Supreme Court

The calls for either limiting the power of the UK Supreme
Court or introducing some element of parliamentary
involvement in selection have risen in response to the view that
the UK Supreme Court has been enlarging its exercise of power.
In order to understand why that view exists, one must turn to
the power of the Supreme Court and its wider role in the UK’s
separation of powers structure.
Unlike the powers of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the powers of the UK Supreme Court are not easily
located in a single document, in a group of documents, or in
pieces of legislation. The court was created by legislation in
2005.104 The legislation, however, did not enumerate powers,
nor did it define the court’s role within the broader
constitutional framework. Without any text to interpret, how
best can the powers of the UK Supreme Court be analyzed?
As with its predecessor, the UKSC enjoys wide powers of
review over actions of the government and its various
agencies.105 Section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which
102. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 695 (1997).
103. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
104. Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4 (Eng.), https://perma.cc/7Q6ZWBYH.
105. Most of the legislation that regulates the relationship between the
citizen and the state will address how individuals can redress potential
grievances arising from decisions of the government and other executive

346

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 323 (2021)

survived the creation of the Supreme Court, deals with the
various procedures and powers of the Supreme Court in relation
to judicial review.106 In addition to substantive judicial review,
which examines the outcome of a decision, the courts in the UK
(including the UKSC) have the power to look into the legality of
executive decisions, i.e., whether these actions are ultra vires
and if procedural guarantees have been met.107 However, unlike
its US counterpart, the UKSC cannot strike down legislation or
call into question the validity of Acts of Parliament (i.e.,
legislation).108
Over the past two decades, primary legislation has given
the UKSC a number of new powers. The most important
legislation is the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998). As a
former justice of the Supreme Court Lord Sumption put it,
human rights “are where law and politics meet.”109 HRA 1998
provided the judiciary with new powers to interpret primary
legislation in accordance with Convention Rights.110 It allows a
agencies. Most of these claims occur, at least in the first instance, in front of
tribunals. The status of tribunals and their wider relationship to the UK
judicial system is discussed within the Tribunals, Courts & Enforcement Act
2007, c. 15 (Eng.), https://perma.cc/UUH9-AXK6. For a further discussion of
the tribunal system, see BRADLEY, EWING & KNIGHT, supra note 53, 614– 25.
106. Senior Courts Act 1981, c. 54, § 31 (Eng.), https://perma.cc/XUN4H3Q2.
107. An in-depth discussion of judicial review in the United Kingdom is
beyond the scope of this article. However, for an introduction to the topic, see
WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 67, at 15–32, and BRADLEY, EWING & KNIGHT,
supra note 53, at 583–94.
108. This precedent has been stated as obiter dicta a number of times by
the courts at all levels across the United Kingdom. The case most cited by the
Supreme Court in this regard is British Railways Board v. Pickin [1974] AC
765 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). The case was cited by Lord Bingham of
Cornhill in the leading judgment in R (Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005]
UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 [27] (Lord Bingham) (appeal taken from EWCA
(Civ)). At the time of writing, neither the House of Lords nor the UK Supreme
Court has attempted to call into question the validity of an Act of Parliament,
or to invalidate its provisions.
109. Former Justice Jonathan Sumption, U.K. Sup. Ct., Address at the
Reith Lectures 2019: Law and the Decline of Politics—Lecture 3: Human
Rights and Wrongs (June 4, 2019) (transcript available at https://perma.cc
/F94G-7TFY (PDF)).
110. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 3(1) (Eng.), https://perma.cc/CTX9F4DT. To see how the House of the Lords (the precursor of the UKSC) has
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judge to issue a “declaration of incompatibility” on domestic
legislation deemed to contravene Convention Rights.111
Convention rights are those fundamental rights that one would
expect in any democracy. These include the right to life, the
right to live free from human and degrading treatment, and the
right to a fair trial.112
What makes the debate around the HRA 1998 interesting
is the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. As one
commentator has described it, this doctrine has “almost served
as a surrogate written constitution, making sense of the myriad
conventions and other unarticulated norms that structure the
British system of government.”113 The doctrine of Parliamentary
Sovereignty has been defined as Parliament’s “right to make or
unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body
is recognised by law as having the power to override or set aside
the legislation of Parliament.”114 This definition has three
components:
1. Parliament is Supreme—it can legislate on any topic that
it chooses.

used section 3(1) of the HRA 1998, see Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004]
UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). Ghaidan dealt
with whether the terms “spouse” or “husband” used in the Rent Act 1977, c.
42 (Eng.), also encompassed those in same-sex relationships.
111. Section 4(6) of the HRA 1998 provides that:
A declaration under this section (“a declaration of
incompatibility”)—(a) does not affect the validity, continuing
operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is
given; and (b) is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in
which it is made.
Since the coming into force of the HRA 1998, the House of Lords and the
Supreme Court have issued twenty-nine declarations of incompatibility. See
BRADLEY, EWING & KNIGHT, supra note 53, at 382–85. Of these, twenty have
led to primary legislation being changed by Parliament. Bradley et al. argue
that “it is a striking feature of this power, that the courts will go to
considerable lengths to avoid using it.” Id at 382–85.
112. US readers should perhaps think of these rights as the first ten
amendments to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. The Convention
Rights are found within Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act of 1998. Human
Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 1(3), sch. 1 (UK).
113. Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the
United Kingdom, 108 NW. L. REV. 543, 551 (2014).
114. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 38 (7th ed. 1908).
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2. No person or body can question the validity of an Act of
Parliament.
3. No Parliament can bind its successors.

It is within this context that the UK Supreme Court uses its
powers of judicial review under sections 3 and 4 of the HRA
1998. These sections provide the Supreme Court with tools that
have reshaped its role and the wider role of the judiciary within
the UK’s constitutional framework.
The HRA 1998 made more acute a debate that had been
played out among scholars for decades. Is it Parliamentary
Sovereignty or the rule of law that controls how the Constitution
operates? To Lord Sumption, who since retiring as a justice of
the Supreme Court has been critical of a purported rise in
judicial power:
The Courts have developed a broader concept of the rule of
law which greatly enlarges their constitutional role. They
have claimed a wider supervisory authority over other
organs of the State. They have inched their way towards a
notion of fundamental law overriding the ordinary processes
of political decision-making, and these things have
inevitably carried them into the realms of legislative and
ministerial policy.115

In R (Jackson) v. Attorney General,116 this debate played out
among the then-members of the Appellate Committee of the
House of Lords.117 To Lord Steyn, “the classic account given by
Dicey of the doctrine of supremacy of Parliament, pure and
absolutely as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the
modern United Kingdom.”118
This statement drew support from Lord Hope and Lady
Hale,119 and provides support for Justice Sumption’s contention
115. Former Justice Jonathan Sumption, U.K. Sup. Ct., Address at the
Reith Lectures 2019: Law and the Decline of Politics—Lecture 2: In Praise of
Politics (May 28, 2019) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/27RKNBMU(PDF)).
116. [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
117. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords was the precursor to
the UK Supreme Court.
118. R (Jackson) [2005] UKHL 56, [102] (Lord Steyn) (emphasis added).
119. Id. [104]–[109] (Lord Hope of Craighead); id. [159] (Lady Hale of
Richmond). Lord Hope would become the first deputy president of the
Supreme Court and Lady Hale would be the first female appointed as
president of the Supreme Court.
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that judges now see themselves as guardians of the rule of law
and protection against an overbearing Parliament.120 This
evolving notion is at the very heart of the role of the judiciary
within the UK’s constitutional framework. One noted
commentator argues that the judiciary are merely upholding
their traditional role in holding the executive to account and
providing clarity to statutory legislation.121 According to this
analysis, judicial review is “the legal mechanism through which
the courts routinely effectuate the regulatory scheme
challenged before them.”122 This perspective on their role has
regularly been expressed extra-judicially by justices of the
Supreme Court.123
This argument, however, places too much emphasis on the
UK constitution as a legal document and downplays the political
nature of the UK Constitution. Before becoming the president
of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger warned:
For appointed judges to claim the right to override the will
of the democratically elected legislature, when they cannot
claim to have been accorded that right by popular mandate,
whether directly or through Parliament, seems to me to be
unmaintainable unless they have been expressly given that
right by the people acting through their democratically
elected representatives.124

120. Other members of the House of Lords did not come to the same
conclusion on this matter as Lord Hope, Lady Hale, and Lord Steyn. However,
the mere fact that three members of the House of Lords (two of whom would
be among the first justices of the new Supreme Court) discussed the issue of
obiter dicta demonstrates their potential assertiveness against the
Government and Parliament.
121. Paul Craig, Judicial Power, the Judicial Power Project and the UK,
36 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 355 (2017).
122. Id. at 367.
123. Lady Hale, Deputy President, U.K. Sup. Ct., Inaugural Lecture at the
Institute for Legal and Constitutional Research: The U.K. Supreme Court in
the United Kingdom Constitution (Oct. 8, 2015) (transcript available at
https://perma.cc/JF7R-KNUB (PDF)); Lord Neuberger, President, U.K. Sup.
Ct., Address at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore: Has the
Identity of the English Common Law Been Eroded By EU Laws and the
European Convention of Human Rights? (Aug. 18, 2016) (transcript available
at https://perma.cc/TZT8-4QYP (PDF)).
124. Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Master of the Rolls, Speech at the
Second Lord Alexander of Weedon Lecture: Who Are the Masters Now? (Apr.
6, 2011) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/Z5K5-TGK5 (PDF)).
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To Lord Neuberger, parliamentary sovereignty remains the
controlling doctrine. His remarks present a middle ground
between the two sides of the debate—the rule of law is vital, but
judges should not downplay the importance of parliamentary
sovereignty. This approach was perhaps best illustrated by the
court’s judgment in R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting
the European Union,125 where the role of parliamentary
sovereignty proved the central issue. Miller (No. 1) dealt with
the technical issue of how the then-Prime Minister, Theresa
May, could start Brexit negotiations and invoke Article 50 of the
Treaty of the European Union. To the majority, the issue was
“whether a formal notice of withdrawal can lawfully be given by
ministers without prior legislation passed in both Houses of
Parliament and assented to by HM The Queen.”126 By a majority
of eight to three, the justices held that any notice to leave the
EU first had to be enacted by an Act of Parliament. The decision
was seen as a victory for the sovereignty of Parliament over the
government.127
Inherent in an uncodified constitution is a degree of
flexibility that should leave sufficient room for judges to
consider the political ramifications of their decisions.
Championing an overly legalistic interpretation negates any
political ramifications that may arise because of a judicial
decision. Because it expanded the courts’ powers, the
introduction of HRA 1998 intensified the debate. Judges now
perceive their role in enforcing the rule of law the “ultimate
safeguard against such abuses of the legislative power of
Parliament.”128
A further consequence of the HRA 1998 was the expansion
of the scope of judicial review to include proportionality review.
The most recent definition of proportionality was provided by
125. [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61 (appeal taken from EWHC (Admin)).
126. Id. at [2].
127. See generally Robert Craig, Miller Supreme Court Case Summary,
U.K. CONST. L. ASS’N: BLOG (Jan. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/9N9N-RLMV
(describing Parliament’s power in domestic disputes over the government);
Mark Elliott, The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller: In Search of
Constitutional Principle, 76 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 257 (2017).
128. Lord Hope, Deputy President, UK Sup. Ct., Address at the WG Hart
Legal Workshop—Sovereignty in Question: A View from the Bench 12 (June
28, 2011) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/UXD9-C3CJ (PDF)).
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Lord Sumption in Bank Mellat v. Her Majesty’s Treasury (No.
2).129 In that decision, he wrote that, in reviewing legislation,
the Supreme Court should:
[D]etermine: (i) whether its objective is sufficiently
important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; (ii)
whether it is rationally connected to the objective; (iii)
whether a less intrusive measure could have been used; and
(iv) whether, having regard to these matters and to the
severity of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck
between the rights of the individual and the interests of the
community.130

This definition leaves room for the justices to make value
judgments that typically have been reserved for ministers and
Members of Parliament. Commentators have argued that “the
proportionality test remains a powerful normative and
prescriptive tool in the hands of judges in judicial review,”131
because it “act[s] as a standing invitation for courts to decide,
and then decide again, what is proportionate or fair.”132
An example of how the Supreme Court deploys the four-part
proportionality test is its recent judgment in R (Steinfeld and
Keidan) v. Secretary of State for International Development.133
That case dealt with the decision of the government to exclude
opposite-sex couples from enjoying the benefits of a civil
partnership, which at the time was only open to same-sex
couples. Exercising proportionality review, Lord Kerr
explained134 that a “new form of discrimination was introduced”
by the legislation135 and that “the government had to eliminate
the inequality of treatment immediately.”136 Commentators
have noted that inherent in proportionality is a “culture of

129. [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] 1 AC 700 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
130. Id. at [20].
131. Tom Hickman, Problems for Proportionality, 2010 N.Z. L. REV 303,
317.
132. Richard Ekins & Graham Gee, Putting Judicial Power in Its Place,
36 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 375, 383 (2017), https://perma.cc/HH9J-87CR (PDF).
133. [2018] UKSC 32, [2020] AC 1 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
134. Id. at [41]–[53] (Lord Kerr SCJ).
135. Id. at [46] (emphasis added).
136. Id. at [50].
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justification,”137 that is, that the doctrine “imposes a burden on
the public authority to justify its conduct.”138 This shifts the
ground on which the UK’s Constitutional framework is based;
Parliament and the Government now need to justify their
actions in all potential cases under the HRA 1998. While
Parliament and the Government often have political reasons for
making decisions, proportionality review allows judges to
question these decisions and make their own normative, value
judgments on issues traditionally reserved for Parliament and
the Government.
Proportionality is currently limited to HRA 1998 claims.139
The Supreme Court has refrained from making it available for
all cases. Lord Neuberger, for one, has contended that using
proportionality for all claims would have “potentially profound
and far-reaching consequences.”140 Using proportionality in all
cases “threatens to collapse the fundamental distinction
between the role of judges and public officials.”141 These
far-reaching consequences could augment the judiciary’s role
within trias politica and lead to greater encroachment into
territory once occupied by ministers and Members of
Parliament.
Another source for its expanding role is that, as with its US
counterpart, the UKSC is increasingly being used by individuals
and organizations to address major political issues. Again, Lord
Sumption puts it memorably: “To adopt the famous dictum of
the German military theorist Clausewitz about war, law is now
the continuation of politics by other means.”142 Two recent cases
involving the UK’s departure from the European Union—first
137. Jeffrey Jowell, The Democratic Necessity of Administrative Justice,
2006 ACTA JURIDICA 13, 18 (quoting Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where?
Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994)).
138. Hickman, supra note 131, at 314.
139. Ass’n of Brit. Civilian Internees: Far E. Region v. SOS for Def. [2003]
EWCA (Civ) 473, [2003] QB 1397 (appeal taken from EWHC (Admin)).
140. Keyu v. SOS for Foreign and Commonwealth Affs. [2015] UKSC 69,
[2016] AC 1355, [133] (Lord Neuberger P) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
Lord Neuberger obiter discussed that the Supreme Court could change this
approach but only if it was considered by a nine-member panel of the Supreme
Court. Id. at [132].
141. Tom Hickman, The Substance and Structure of Proportionality, 2008
PUB. L. 694, 701.
142. Sumption, supra note 115, at 6.
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the Article 50 case in 2017 and then the prorogation case in
2019—illustrate this point and involved the court sitting as a
full, eleven-member panel. In both cases, the Supreme Court
ruled against the government.143 In the prorogation case, the
justices were at pains to explain that the issue before the court
was not a political issue: “It is important to emphasise that the
issue in these appeals is not when and on what terms the United
Kingdom is to leave the European Union.”144 The issue to Lady
Hale and Lord Reed was the lawfulness of the Prime Minister’s
advice on prorogation.145 A unanimous court ruled the advice
unlawful, and the Order in Council was rendered null and
void.146 To several commentators, this decision was a response
to a legal question and was “correct and compelling.”147
In his opinion, Lord Sumption compared the UK’s
constitution to the US Constitution. To Sumption, the latter is
the “archetypal legal constitution. Britain, by comparison, has
historically been the archetypal political state.”148 In Miller (No.
2), the justices were asked to rule on a matter with profound
political consequences on a deeply divisive political
issue—whether the prorogation of Parliament by the Prime
Minister was lawful. Lord Reed extra-judicially stated that this
presented a case in which “public opinion is sharply divided.”149
Indeed, commentators have argued that the ratio in Miller (No.
2) was “not a legal argument” but rather a “political
143. In the Article 50 case, the judgment was 8-3, and in the prorogation
case, the court was unanimous in its opinion in ruling against the
Government. R (Miller) v. SOS for Exiting the E.U. [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC
61 (appeal taken from EWHC (Admin)) (Article 50 case); R (Miller) v. Prime
Minister [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373 (appeal taken from EWHC (QB))
(prorogation case).
144. R (Miller) [2019] UKSC 41, [1].
145. Id. at [27].
146. An Order in Council is similar in substance to an Executive order.
147. Paul Craig, The Supreme Court, Prorogation and Constitutional
Principle, 2020 PUB. L. 248, 248.
148. Former Justice Jonathan Sumption, U.K. Sup. Ct., The Reith
Lectures 2019: Law and the Decline of Politics, Lecture 4: Rights and the Ideal
Constitution 2 (June 11, 2019) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/TTV9DHGP (PDF)).
149. Lord Reed, Deputy President, U.K. Sup. Ct., Presidential Address at
The Bentham Association Lecture: The Supreme Court Ten Years On 13 (Mar.
6, 2019) (transcript available at https://perma.cc/563T-48RA (PDF)).
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evaluation.”150 By engaging in this debate and ruling against the
government, the justices involved themselves in the political
game. Instead, the Supreme Court could have followed the
example of the High Court (the lower court), which ruled in
favor of the Prime Minister by holding that the question was
political in nature and non-justiciable.151
One leading critic of this rise in judicial power argues that
the Supreme Court should have taken the opportunity “to arrest
a worrying trend of judicializing political questions.”152 In this
context, Lord Bingham’s prescient statement comes to mind:
“The democratic process is liable to be subverted if, on a
question of moral and political judgment, opponents of the Act
achieve through the courts what they could not achieve in
Parliament.”153
The motives of the plaintiffs in Miller (No. 2) were clear—to
secure a further referendum and frustrate the Brexit process.154
Typically, motives are not questioned on judicial review.
However, for many judicial review claims it is difficult to
separate the motive of the claimants from their intended
outcome. Judges are being put in the uncomfortable position of
ruling on questions of a political nature. This has led to judges
issuing judgments on diverse issues ranging from transport

150. Richard Ekins & Stephen Laws, The Supreme Court Has Done
Lasting Damage to Our Constitution, PROSPECT (Oct. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc
/DDE5-7Q7D.
151. R (Miller) v. Prime Minister [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB), [51]. As alluded
to earlier in this Article, supra note 57 and accompanying text, there are a
number of distinct legal systems in the UK. There is an English and Welsh
system, a separate Scottish system, and another for Northern Ireland. The
Prime Minister’s decision to prorogue Parliament was challenged in each
jurisdiction. The Court of Session of the Inner House, in Scotland, found in
favor of the Appellants, and in England and Wales, the High Court found in
favor of the Prime Minister. For a background on the case and an overview,
see Mark Elliott, A New Approach to Constitutional Adjudication? Miller II in
the Supreme Court, PUB. L. FOR EVERYONE (Sept. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc
/RV5H-KJKN.
152. RICHARD EKINS, POL’Y EXCH., PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
POLITICS OF PROROGATION 6 (2019), https://perma.cc/PSW9-G9Y7 (PDF).
153. R (Countryside All.) v. A-G [2007] UKHL 52, [2008] 1 AC 719, [45]
(Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
154. Gina Miller, Opinion, People Want a Proper Say on Brexit. Let Them
Have It, GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/ET77-A9VM.
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policy, to welfare benefits, to court fees.155 Some see this trend
as threatening “the rule of law, responsible law-making and
self-government.”156
IV. Interpretive Methodologies
A.

Constitutional Interpretation by the Supreme Court of the
United States

Describing the power of judicial review, then-Judge John
Roberts Jr., at his confirmation hearings in 2005, remarked
that:
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they
apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.
They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a
limited role. Nobody ever went to a ballgame to see the
umpire.157

As readers who follow sports will know, how umpires and
referees interpret the rules in sports has tremendous impact on
the outcome of the game being played. Just so, how the Supreme
Court interprets the Constitution—whether by textualism,
originalism, or as a living document—has a significant impact
on its decisions.
The two methods of constitutional interpretation that seem
to qualify as the new dominant orthodoxy are textualism and
originalism. Textualism is best defined as a strict construction
of the words as written.158 Originalism requires “that the Court
should ascribe meaning to the Constitution’s text that is

155. See generally Packham v. SOS for Transp. [2020] EWHC (Admin) 829
(issuing a judgment on the decision by the Secretary of State for Transport to
continue the HS2 rail project); RR v. SOS for Work and Pensions [2019] UKSC
52 (appeal taken from UKUT (AAC)) (determining the extent to which the
appellant was entitled to housing benefits); R (UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor
[2017] UKSC 51 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)) (deciding dispute
determining fee allocation in employment tribunal proceedings).
156. Ekins & Gee, supra note 132, at 385.
157. Transcript: Roberts’s Opening Statement, supra note 99.
158. For a more in-depth discussion of the history of textualism and a
definition of textualism, see generally Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91
VA. L. REV. 347 (2005).
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consistent with its commonly understood meaning at the time
the Constitution was adopted.”159
There are differences to each of these methods, but the two
are often synonymous. For example, one cannot truly define the
meaning of the words used in the Constitution without knowing
the intent of the person(s) who drafted them. The approach of
originalists is to first look at the text of the Constitution or piece
of legislation and second, to ask what the piece of legislation
meant to those who wrote the document.
Justice Antonin Scalia was perhaps the most famous
advocate of originalism. To paraphrase his perspective, the role
of the judge is to say what the law is, not what the law should
be. 160 One former Scalia law clerk, and a leading scholar on the
subject of originalism, recalled that Justice Scalia would often
turn to the history of the United States, records of the
Constitutional Convention, and the dictionary that would have
been used by the Founders at the time the Constitution was
ratified to interpret constitutional text.161
The power of originalism can be seen in the role it has had
in shaping the Court’s philosophy and how it has underpinned
some of the Court’s key modern decisions. One case that
academics cite as the pinnacle of the triumph of the originalist
ideology is District of Columbia v. Heller.162 In Heller, in an
opinion written by Justice Scalia, the majority held that the
Second Amendment guarantees a personal right to keep and
bear arms.163 Cass Sunstein has labelled the majority opinion
“the most explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion in
the history of the Supreme Court.”164 Jeffrey Shaman goes one
step further, asserting that Heller was the Court’s first
159. Adam Lamparello & Charles E. Maclean, Originalism and the
Criminal Law: Vindicating Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence—and the
Constitution, 50 AKRON L. REV. 227, 234 (2016).
160. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 849 (1989); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
161. Gary Lawson, Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, the Judicial
Method, and the Adjudicative Limits of Originalism, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2265,
2279 (2017).
162. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
163. Id. at 573–636.
164. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as
Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 246 (2008).

US & UK SUPREME COURTS

357

originalist decision.165 These perspectives may well be valid;
Justice Scalia’s opinion often reads more like it belongs in an
academic history journal than in the United States Reports.
Indeed, the originalist nature of the opinion had an impact on
the dissents issued by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer.166
Both justices engaged largely in a historical debate with Justice
Scalia about what the ratifiers of the Second Amendment to the
Constitution meant when they used the phrase “the right to
keep and bear arms.”167
An earlier Justice Scalia decision also provides an excellent
example of originalism and how it has come to shape the Court’s
opinions. In Crawford v. Washington,168 the issue was the
meaning of the text of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him . . . .”169 Before Crawford, the Court’s non-textualist,
case-by-case reliability approach to the Confrontation Clause
can be seen in its decision in Ohio v. Roberts.170 By a majority of
6–3, the Court in Roberts ruled that because the purpose of the
right to confront is to ensure reliable evidence, hearsay evidence
may be admitted under the Confrontation Clause if it can be
proven that the evidence bears sufficient “indicia of
reliability.”171 This is an excellent example of interpreting the
Constitution as a living document whose principles must be
adapted to changing times. Writing for the three dissenting
justices, Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall and
Stevens) argued that before Roberts, the Court had “imposed a
heavy burden on the prosecution either to secure the presence
165. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
83, 90 (2010) (“[I]t was not until the Court’s decision in District of Columbia v.
Heller in 2008 that Justice Scalia was finally able to garner a majority of the
Court—and only a 5-4 majority, at that—to sign onto an opinion emphatically
taking an originalist slant.”).
166. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 681–723
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
169. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
170. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
171. Id. at 65–66. Justice Blackmun authored the majority opinion in
Roberts.
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of the witness or to demonstrate the impossibility of that
endeavor.”172 The focus then moved to whether the evidence was
reliable whether the witness was available or not.
The “indicia of reliability” doctrine from Roberts has been
heavily criticized. The decisions rendered after Roberts have
been described by one academic as an “unprincipled,
inconsistent, ad hoc, dismal failure.”173 Following Roberts, the
Court considered the Confrontation Clause in Maryland v.
Craig.174 By a 5–4 majority, the Court there held that the
framers had only a “preference” for in-person testimony and
that remote testimony in sensitive cases was constitutional.175
Dissenting in Craig, Justice Scalia argued that the majority had
“failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the
Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion.”176
Two years later, in White v. Illinois,177 Justice Scalia joined
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion restating his position
from Craig about the importance of in-person testimony and his
opposition to reliance solely on the reliability framework that
the majority had created in Roberts.178
Having laid this foundation, the facts in Crawford v.
Washington presented Justice Scalia with an opportunity to
depart from the precedent of Roberts and put in place his own,
textualist interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause.179 Crawford has been described as
“among the most important constitutional cases in modern
times.”180 The issue facing the Court in Crawford was whether
a taped statement made in the police station by the petitioner’s
wife was admissible as evidence; the witness was unavailable
due to the marital privilege, so she was not—and had not
172. Id. at 78–79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure:
The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?,
94 GEO. L.J. 183, 185 (2005).
174. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
175. Id. at 849. The factual issue in Craig was whether a victim of a sexual
offense, who was a minor, could testify via closed circuit television. Id. at 840.
176. Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
178. Id. at 358–66 (Thomas, J., concurring).
179. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
180. Lawson, supra note 161, at 2266.
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been—subject to cross-examination.181 Justice Scalia’s opinion
is a tour de force of the originalist methodology; he surveys the
history of the Sixth Amendment and helps to place readers in
both the minds and historical context of those who ratified the
Sixth Amendment.
From the start, Justice Scalia noted that petitioner argued
that Roberts “strays from the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause and urges us to reconsider it.”182 Scalia’s
first step is to look at the text of the Sixth Amendment.
However, as Justice Scalia noted, in this case “[t]he
Constitution’s text does not alone resolve this case.”183
Therefore, Justice Scalia adopted an originalist perspective and
“turn[ed] to the historical background of the Clause to
understand its meaning.”184 The route to understanding the
scope of the Confrontation Clause, to Justice Scalia, is in the
common law, with its adversarial process and physical
confrontation of witnesses.185 He notes that the idea of
admitting out-of-court statements would have been anathema
to the common law, aside from its reliance on Marian pre-trial
examinations. The opinion proceeds with a lively account of Sir
Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason at the turn of the 17th
Century, which resulted in Raleigh’s conviction based largely on
an out-of-court affidavit.186 Justice Scalia discusses how
“[t]hrough a series of statutory and judicial reforms, English law
developed a right of confrontation that limited these abuses.”187
Justice Scalia then turned to the colonies and noted that a
number of the early state constitutions guaranteed a right of

181. For the factual background of the case, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at
38 – 42.
182. Id. at 42–43. Indeed, if one listens or reviews the transcript of oral
arguments, the issue was at the front and center of the case. It was clear the
Petitioners were urging that the precedent handed down in Roberts be
overturned. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Crawford, 541
U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), https://perma.cc/C2B4-5Y2C (PDF).
183. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.
184. Id. at 43.
185. Id. at 43–50 (discussing at length the conceptual roots of “[t]he right
to confront one’s accusers” in the common law).
186. Id. at 44–45.
187. Id. at 44.
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confrontation.188 He charts the early interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment by the States, including a North Carolina case,
State v. Webb,189 in which the North Carolina Superior Court
rejected a broad reading of then-existing English law and held:
“[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that
no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the
liberty to cross examine.”190
With this backdrop, Justice Scalia concluded that “the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly
its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused.”191 Flowing from this is Scalia’s second conclusion that
“the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he
was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”192 Therefore, any variation
from these two principles would be contrary to the Sixth
Amendment. These two inferences are crucial to Justice Scalia’s
decision (with all but two members of the Court agreeing) to
overturn the Court’s 1980 Roberts decision.193 Identifying his
“principal evil” of the Sixth Amendment is critical to textualism
and originalism; to Justice Scalia and others, any demurral from
the intent of those who ratified the Sixth Amendment is an evil
in itself that needs to be cured by overruling contrary precedent.
Justice Scalia takes particular aim at the second element of
the Roberts framework—the notion of relying on judicial
findings of reliability. “Where testimonial statements are
involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence,
much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”194
He continues by arguing:
188. Id. at 48–49.
189. State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794).
190. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (quoting Webb, 2 N.C.
(1 Hayw.) at 104).
191. Id. at 50.
192. Id. at 53–54.
193. The only two justices who dissented from the decision to overrule the
precedent were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Id.
at 36.
194. Id. at 61.
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The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by
the adversary process, based on a mere judicial
determination of reliability. It thus replaces the
constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability
with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is very different
from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that make no
claim to be a surrogate means of assessing reliability.195

Justice Scalia finishes on a crescendo, which was typical of his
acerbic style. “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony
is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because
a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth
Amendment prescribes.”196
Therefore, because the Court’s decision in Roberts, and
particularly the reliability framework, demurs from the original
intent and the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, Justice Scalia
ushered away twenty-four years of precedent presumably to
give the Sixth Amendment its true meaning.
With the passing of Justice Scalia in February 2016, some
predicted the death of originalism and textualism. That
prediction turned out to be quite wrong. For one, Justice Scalia’s
replacement on the Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch, is a
self-described originalist.197 Justice Thomas has also shown
flashes of an originalist ideology. The continuing importance of
textualism and the legacy of Justice Scalia were seen most
recently in Bostock v. Clayton County. That case involved three
joined cases in which the issue was whether the term “sex,” as
used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 prohibiting
discrimination, encompasses discrimination against members of
the LGBTQ community.198 Justice Gorsuch, writing for a
six-member majority, held that members of the LGBTQ
community were indeed protected by the landmark legislation.
His method to reach this decision is straight from the textualist
and originalist playbook—he seeks to define the term “sex” in a

195. Id. at 62.
196. Id.
197. Nina Totenberg, Judge Gorsuch’s Originalism Contrasts With
Mentor’s Pragmatism, NPR (Feb. 6, 2017, 4:37 AM), https://perma.cc/DV4BNYXQ; Adam Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an Echo of Scalia in Philosophy
and Style, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/644B-YU5M.
198. For a factual overview of the case, see Bostock v. Clayton County, 140
S. Ct. 1731, 1737–38 (2020).
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way that would have been clear to those who had drafted and
passed the legislation in 1964. Gorsuch’s ratio was heavily
attacked by Justice Alito in a scathing dissent, particularly
about Justice Gorsuch’s grounding of the decision in
textualism.199
What makes this case even more interesting was that there
was no concurring opinion from any of the more liberal justices.
One would have imagined that Justice Ginsburg, for example,
would have wanted to offer an opinion that was not grounded in
textualism or originalism, but rather in the meaning behind the
words. Instead, one of the largest constitutional gains for
members of the LGBTQ community is grounded in textualism
and originalism—a narrow definition of a particular term that,
to the majority in Bostock, was intended to encompass members
of that community. Justice Kagan, perhaps, was not speaking
in jest when she commented “[w]e are all textualists now.”200
As this Article was being composed on Friday, September
18, 2020, the tragic news was announced that Ruth Bader
Ginsburg passed away at aged 87, opening a new vacancy on the
Court.201 As a response, President Trump nominated Judge Amy
Coney Barrett, a judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,

199. Id. at 1754–822 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito in his dissent,
wrote—to paraphrase Justice Ginsburg—something of a “zinger.” A passage
at the start of dissent is worth quoting in full:
The Court attempts to pass off its decision as the inevitable product
of the textualist school of statutory interpretation championed by
our late colleague Justice Scalia, but no one should be fooled. The
Court’s opinion is like a pirate ship. It sails under a textualist flag,
but what it actually represents is a theory of statutory
interpretation that Justice Scalia excoriated––the theory that
courts should “update” old statutes so that they better reflect the
current values of society.
Id. at 1755–56 (citation omitted). For further discussion of this nascent
scholarly discussion, see generally Marcia Coyle, Gorsuch, Alito and
Kavanaugh Tangle Over Textualism in Major Win for LGBT Workers, NAT’L
L.J. (June 15, 2020, 3:21 PM), https://perma.cc/H8ZW-9EEH.
200. Elena Kagan, Assoc. Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., The Antonin Scalia Lecture
Series: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes (Nov.
18, 2015), https://perma.cc/UN8R-LG7U.
201. Linda Greenhouse, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court’s Feminist
Icon, Is Dead at 87, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/UB7F-3VZ3
(last updated Sept. 24, 2020).
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and Justice Barrett was subsequently confirmed.202 Justice
Barrett clerked for Justice Scalia in the Supreme Court’s
1998–99 term and has been described by some as the “heir” to
Justice Scalia’s legacy.203 She is a well-known disciple of Justice
Scalia’s interpretative method of constitutional and legislative
interpretation.204 Her appointment will therefore not only have
the potential to remake the Court to a Republican-appointed
majority, but also to place another originalist on the Court.205
For now, Bostock demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s
reliance on textualism and originalism is alive and well.
Apparently, if groups on both sides of a political issue wish to
advance their causes, attempting to construct an argument
around an originalist and textualist interpretation is one way to
get the justices’ attention. The real concern about these methods
of interpretation is their proponents’ argument that they limit
the power of the justices.206 However, the truth is that
textualism and originalism both provide a Supreme Court
justice with enormous conservative power—by relying on
dictionary meanings and interpreting historical contexts, they
are advancing their own conservative views.

202. Nicholas Fandos, Senate Confirms Barrett, Delivering for Trump and
Reshaping the Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/S2GT-P95Z.
203. Peter Baker & Nicholas Fandos, Trump Announces Barrett as
Supreme Court Nominee, Describing Her as Heir to Scalia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
26, 2020), https://perma.cc/S2GT-P95Z (last updated Sept. 28, 2020).
Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s son, Eugene Scalia (currently Secretary of
Labor) and widow, Maureen Scalia, were both present in the Rose Garden as
President Trump made his announcement. Press Release, President Donald J.
Trump, Remarks by President Trump Announcing His Nominee for Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 26, 2020), https://
perma.cc/X6TD-SG7V.
204. Judge Barrett has written numerous works on originalism and
textualism. See generally, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare
Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921 (2017); Amy Coney Barrett & John
Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2016).
205. For a useful summary on Justice Barrett’s positions, see Adam
Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would Push the Supreme Court
to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/AF8A-AYQM.
206. This may help to explain why textualists and originalists generally
are appointed by Republican presidents.

364

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 323 (2021)
B.

Statutory Interpretation by the UK Supreme Court

While the UK Supreme Court does not have a written
constitution to interpret, it wields tremendous power by the way
in which it interprets legislation passed by Parliament. As seen
earlier in this Article, the powers of the Supreme Court are
expanding, with the court arguably becoming more powerful in
its supervisory role over the other branches of government,
especially Parliament, through the HRA, proportionality
review, and its willingness to address heavily politicized issues.
One way in which Parliament has reacted is by inserting “ouster
clauses” into pieces of legislation. An ouster clause is a provision
in a statute that is “aimed at restricting, and sometimes at
eliminating judicial review.”207
The case of R (Evans) v. Attorney General208 provides an
example of how the Supreme Court interprets legislation that
purports to oust it from jurisdiction to review. The case
concerned whether letters written by the Prince of Wales to
ministers in the mid-2000’s could be released under the
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000).209 In R (Evans),
an application was made for disclosure of these letters by a
journalist at The Guardian that was first rejected by the
government. The journalist then appealed to the Information
Commissioner, who upheld the decision of the government and
the journalist then appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT). The
UT ultimately ruled in favor of the journalist and the Attorney
General sought to have this decision reversed by the Supreme
Court.
The case turned on Section 53, subsection 2 of the FOIA
2000, providing that:
A decision notice or enforcement notice to which this section
applies shall cease to have effect if, not later than the
twentieth working day following the effective date, the
accountable person in relation to that authority gives the
Commissioner a certificate signed by him stating that he has
on reasonable grounds formed the opinion that, in respect of
207. WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 67, at 608.
208. R (Evans) v. A-G, [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] AC 1787 (Lord Neuberger
P ) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
209. A fuller account of the facts of the case detail is available in the
opening paragraphs of Lord Neuberger’s judgment. Id. at [1]–[20].
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the request or requests concerned, there was no failure
falling within subsection (1)(b).210

In ordinary English, this means that if an application has been
made and ultimately allowed by the Information Commissioner,
then an “accountable person” can issue a certificate that
overrules this decision.
The Attorney General argued that the legislation,
especially the term “reasonable grounds,” conferred upon him a
wide discretionary power and should be interpreted literally.211
Conversely, the lawyer for Evans argued the legislation “does
not permit the accountable person to issue a certificate simply
because, on the basis of the same facts and issues . . . he takes a
different view from that which was taken.”212 Litigation resulted
in a UT decision holding there was no justification to block the
release of the letters.213 When the case arrived at the Supreme
Court, Lord Neuberger, president of the Supreme Court,
identified two issues: first, whether a decision by a court or
tribunal could be overridden by a minister; and second, whether
decisions of ministers could be reviewed by a court, especially
given the text of section 53 of the FOIA 2000.214 Lord Neuberger,
Lord Kerr, and Lord Reed ruled against the government. They
held that a decision of a tribunal could not be overridden by a
minister and that the decisions of a minister could be reviewed.
To this part of the majority, section 53 did not act as an ouster
clause. Writing for these three justices, Lord Neuberger’s ratio
was that:
A statutory provision which entitles a member of the
executive (whether a Government Minister or the Attorney
General) to overrule a decision of the judiciary merely
because he does not agree with it would not merely be unique
in the laws of the United Kingdom. It would cut across two
constitutional principles which are also fundamental
components of the rule of law.215

210. Freedom of Information Act 2000, c. 36, § 53(2) (UK), https://perma.cc
/6YHX-JAL3.
211. R (Evans) [2015] UKSC 21, [49] (Lord Neuberger P).
212. Id. at [50].
213. Evans v. Info. Comm’r [2012] UKUT (AAC) 313.
214. R (Evans) [2015] UKSC 21, [52].
215. Id. at [51].
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The case has been described as “one of the landmark public-law
cases of the early 21st century.”216 Another scholar argues that
the decision “reflects, at root, divergent attitudes to
fundamental constitutional doctrine and—even further
down—different understandings of the concept of law itself.”217
This ratio has been heavily criticized. Leading the critics were
the two dissenting justices, Lord Wilson and Lord Hughes. Lord
Wilson was most trenchant in his dissent; he contended that “in
reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal did not in my view
interpret s[ection] 53 of FOIA. It re-wrote it.”218 Academics have
joined the criticism. Ekins and Gee argue that the “judgement
does not advance a remotely plausible reading of the
statute . . . .”219 They further reject the idea that the majority
upheld the rule of law, since “the techniques it deploys—highly
implausible interpretation of the statue and highly intrusive
judicial review—serve to compromise that ideal by overturning
settled law and encouraging more litigation.”220
The Judicial Power Project, a Policy Exchange group that
would be best described as “right of center” and that regards the
rise of judicial power with alarm, lists this case among its “50
Problematic Cases”:
The Supreme Court ignores the limits of the judicial role by
rewriting the Freedom of Information Act to effectively
remove the power to prevent the publication of information
that the UK Parliament had conferred on the Attorney
General.221

216. Mark Elliott, A Tangled Constitutional Web: The Black-Spider Memos
and the British Constitution’s Relational Architecture, 2015 PUB. L. 539, 540.
217. T.R.S. Allan, Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism: Reflections on
Evans v Attorney General, 75 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 38, 38 (2016).
218. R (Evans) [2015] UKSC 21, [168] (Lord Wilson SCJ) (emphasis
added).
219. Ekins & Gee, supra note 132, at 388.
220. Id.
221. 50 Problematic Cases, JUD. POWER PROJECT (May 9, 2016), https://
perma.cc/VLZ6-ARGP. These fifty cases, to the Project, are emblematic of a
wider trend of rising judicial power and the threats that it poses to the wider
Constitution. Id.
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Others have argued that Lord Neuberger’s ratio responds
to a “constitutional question.”222 At the heart of that question is
whether a judicial decision can be overridden by a member of
the executive branch. To Lord Neuberger, the answer is a clear
“no.” He recognized this issue by paraphrasing a previous
member of the House of Lords, Lord Templeman, to whom such
a notion would “reverse the result of the Civil War.”223 This
“constitutional question” and its potential impact on the
separation of powers led Lord Mance and Lady Hale to join the
majority, albeit for different reasons. Lord Mance framed the
question as an “administrative law question,” focusing more on
the merits of the Attorney General’s decision.224 Lord Mance saw
a broader interpretation of section 53 than Lord Neuberger.225
To Lord Mance, the Attorney General can overrule a decision by
the UT but only if the minister finds that there was an error of
law.226 Lady Hale noted that she and Lord Mance took a “rather
more cautious” view “but agreed that a higher hurdle than
rationality was required for a valid certificate. It was not good
enough for the Attorney General simply to weigh the relevant
public interests differently from the tribunal . . . .”227
Both justices found the rationale for the Attorney General’s
decision lacking. In his decision, Lord Neuberger attempted to
pre-empt some of the inevitable criticism. Lord Neuberger
quoted Lord Hoffman, another former member of the House of
222. Elliott, supra note 216, at 546 (“Th[e] disagreement . . . plays out on
a much broader constitutional canvas, being concerned not with the
appropriate depth of judicial scrutiny (which is itself, admittedly, an
ultimately constitutional question) but with the deployment of normative
principles so as to interpretively neutralise unconstitutional executive
authority.”).
223. R (Evans) v. A-G [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] AC 1787, [53] (Lord
Neuberger P) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)) (citing M v. Home Office [1993]
UKHL 5, [1994] 1 AC 377 (HL) 395 (Lord Templeman) (appeal taken from
QB)).
224. Elliott, supra note 216, at 542.
225. R (Evans) [2015] UKSC 21, [124] (Lord Mance SCJ) (“I consider that
s[ection] 53 must have been intended by Parliament to have, and can and
should be read as having, a wider potential effect than that which Lord
Neuberger has attributed to it.”).
226. Id. at [145].
227. Lady Hale, Deputy President, U.K. Sup. Ct., Sultan Azlan Shah
Lecture: The Supreme Court: Guardian of the Constitution? 7 (Nov. 9, 2016)
(transcript available at https://perma.cc/NY8Q-BAGT (PDF)).
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Lords, that “fundamental rights cannot be overridden by
general or ambiguous words.”228 This was also addressed by
Lady Hale; for her, the statutory provisions had to be “crystal
clear.”229 Indeed, it has been argued that Lord Neuberger’s
interpretation is perfectly within the confines of parliamentary
sovereignty and does no “violence” to the text.”230
Even usually supportive court scholars argue that the
decision may be among those “controversial cases where it can
be argued that the courts went too far . . . .”231 Indeed, it is
difficult not to so conclude. As academics have pointed out, it
would have been difficult for Parliament to foresee the judiciary,
especially a president of the Supreme Court, interpreting the
legislation in a way that effectively limits the power of ministers
that is clearly given to them by legislation. Therefore, one finds
the interpretation of Lord Hughes, Lord Wilson, and the
decisions’ critics more plausible. Parliament empowered a
responsible person to override a decision of the Information
Commissioner/UT. If ministers had been using the power under
section 53 extensively, then Lord Neuberger’s interpretation is
more plausible. However, the Supreme Court found only limited
use of section 53 by ministers.232 One could understand Lord
Neuberger using judicial review to sanction ministers for acting
ultra vires on several occasions, but this was not the case.
Without a codified constitution to fall back on, justices of
the UK Supreme Court wield tremendous power in how they
ultimately interpret legislation. By failing to interpret the
words as they are enacted by Parliament, justices are imposing
their own views and values on legislation. As Justice Antonin
Scalia warned in his early years on SCOTUS: “It is very difficult
for a person to discern a difference between those political
values that he personally thinks most important, and those
political values that are ‘fundamental to our society.’”233 By
interpreting the text of legislation in the manner that the
228. R (Evans) [2015] UKSC 21, [56] (Lord Neuberger P) (quoting R v. SOS
for the Home Dep’t [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL) 131 (Lord
Hoffmann) (appeal taken from QB)).
229. Lady Hale, supra note 227, at 7.
230. Allan, supra note 217, at 48.
231. Craig, supra note 121, at 363.
232. R (Evans) [2015] UKSC 21, [60]–[66].
233. Scalia, supra note 160, at 863.
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justices did in R (Evans), the justices go so far from the meaning
of legislation that they end up practically rewriting it to suit
their own interpretation of higher fundamental principles. One
could argue that the further that UK Supreme Court goes
beyond the text of legislation, the more it threatens
representative democracy and parliamentary supremacy.
V.

Comparative Analysis

The start of this article considered the words of Winston
Churchill, speaking after the end of World War II, who
recognized a “special relationship” between the United Kingdom
and the United States.234 This article has shown that, when
considering the respective supreme courts, there are, indeed,
many similarities between them. Both institutions are
incredibly important within their wider separation of powers
structure. Both decide cases that present a challenge to
separation of powers notions, which inevitably draws both
courts into what can often be uncomfortable and highly
contentious debates with the other branches of government.
This Article has examined three distinct aspects of the
courts—the nomination and appointment process for the
justices, the powers of the courts and the role of the courts
within the respective separation of powers scheme, and finally,
a more in-depth examination of how the respective courts
interpret their bedrock legal documents: the Constitution (US)
and parliamentary legislation (UK). What then can we learn
from this comparison?
On the appointment process, it is clear that the US
appointment process is infinitely more political than the UK
appointment process. From the start of the US
process—presidential candidates muse on who they appoint to
the Court—to the end of the process—Senators weigh carefully
whether to confirm or not—politics is at the heart of the process.
As this Article has shown, politics did enter the minds of the
Framers of the Constitution; however, the Framers may not
have envisioned the hyper-partisan events that Supreme Court
nominations have become. Indeed, the public spectacles of the
confirmation of two justices—Clarence Thomas and Brett
234.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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Kavanaugh, and now a third Amy Coney Barrett—may have the
Framers wondering what ever happened to their design.
Moving forward, the US can learn something from the UK
process. Justices of the UKSC are chosen because of their legal
experience and are appointed on merit, without any discernible
examination of legal or judicial philosophy and without any
substantial popular participation. Perhaps, as Professors David
Strauss and Cass Sunstein have suggested, the Senate could
examine more about the fitness for office rather than dissecting
individual judicial philosophies or grandstanding to win
votes.235 While it would appear, unlike in the UK, that the
Supreme Court of the United States derives much of its
legitimacy from the role of elected officials in the selection of the
justices, a more merits-based selection process might be a
greater positive public face to the appointment process, which
can only improve the standing of both the Senate and the
Supreme Court. The fact that elected officials select and consent
to the appointment does not necessarily mean the process has
to be superficial.
Moving to the powers and role of the respective courts, both
courts maintain broad supervisory review powers over the other
branches of government. One way that the UK Supreme Court
is becoming more like SCOTUS is its ability to answer profound
questions of constitutional importance where law meets politics.
The two Miller cases were emblematic of these decisions. The
upcoming year for the UKSC promises to be another one in
which the court will hand down decisions that will impact the
government.236 The center of the political world will once again
focus on the Supreme Court.
The UK Supreme Court is becoming more like its
counterpart in Washington, D.C. It is wielding more powers and
it is less likely to back down in a conflict with the other branches
235. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1517–18.
236. Two cases are worth mentioning: the first case is whether the decision
to build a third runway at Heathrow Airport in London infringes
environmental legislation and the second case involves whether the
government can legally remove the citizenship of a British citizen who had
traveled to Syria and swore an allegiance to Daesh (ISIL). R (Plan B Earth
Ltd.) v. SOS for Transp. [2020] EWCA (Civ) 214 (appeal taken from EWHC
(Admin)); Begum v. Special Immigr. Appeals Comm’n [2020] ECWA (Civ) 918
(appeal taken from EWHC (Admin)).
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of government. As demonstrated above, a major reason for this
is the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Act provides
the UK Supreme Court with previously unavailable powers. It
has required and empowered judges to interpret legislation in
previously unforeseen ways and to issue a declaration of
incompatibility if necessary.
Furthermore, and perhaps what is more difficult to
quantify, is the rising propensity of the UK Supreme Court to
take on, rather than avoid, difficult questions or simply to rule
issues as non-justiciable. This has long been a trend in the
United States, with SCOTUS regularly issuing rulings that
have challenged the powers of the Presidency.237 The UK
Supreme Court is seemingly following this example, perhaps
emboldened by its new HRA powers; in the prorogation case, the
court easily could have followed the decision of the High Court
and ruled the matter to be political in nature and therefore
non-justiciable.238 However, the UK Supreme Court
unanimously ruled that the issue was justiciable and the advice
given unlawful, providing an embarrassing defeat for the
government.
Such decisions present a challenge to the legitimacy of the
UK Supreme Court. Yes, as has been argued above, justices
draw their authority slightly differently from Members of
Parliament. UK Supreme Court justices draw their authority
from the long history of judicial independence and the
framework set out by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and
the Crime and Courts Act 2013. However, unlike in the United
States, UK Supreme Court justices do not have their legitimacy
drawn from representatives of the people. In the United States,
the potential justices face a barrage of questions from Senators
and arguably are more legitimate in the sense that their
position is ultimately given to them by representatives of the
people. This is not something UK Supreme Court justices can
do. It is perhaps why there have not been calls to rein in the
power of US justices.

237. See generally, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 140 S. Ct. 660 (2019); Trump v. Mazars USA,
LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
238. See supra Part III.B.
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Finally, both courts wield tremendous power in the way
that they interpret text—whether that be the Constitution in
the United States or legislation in the United Kingdom. One
recommendation for justices of the UK Supreme Court is that
they follow the example set by Justice Scalia and Justice
Gorsuch—that is, to look more at the text and historical context
of how legislation is passed. In the same way that the US
Constitution is supreme in the United States, Parliament is
supreme in the United Kingdom. Justices of the Supreme Court
need to remember this when they are interpreting statutes.
Attempts to demur from this doctrine, thinly dressed as
“defending the rule of law,” are likely to see the Supreme Court’s
powers decreased and its membership more determined by
politics.
VI. Conclusion
What does the future hold for the respective courts? In the
United States, the 2020 presidential election has resulted in
prolonged litigation (including in the Supreme Court),239 and a
Georgia runoff election determined the Senate majority.240
Justice Ginsburg has died and been replaced; another justice is
in his eighties.241 It may be that SCOTUS will prove to have
been pivotal to the conclusion of the presidential election, as it
was in Bush v. Gore.242 Important decisions on the power of
Congress to enact the Affordable Care Act243 and on the
continuing attack on Roe v. Wade are also on the horizon. What
impact the Court’s rulings on these issues will have on the
Court’s legitimacy remains to be seen.
On the other side of the pond, as this piece was being
written, the UK Government announced its appointment of an

239. Deanna Paul, Election 2020: Trump Campaign Lawsuits, Explained,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2020, 3:45 PM), https://perma.cc/9Q79-VBMC.
240. Luke Broadwater, What’s a Runoff, and Why Are There Two? Here’s
Why Georgia Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/KR3D-JY4W
(last updated Dec. 5, 2020).
241. Greenhouse, supra note 201.
242. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
243. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840).
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independent panel to examine the system of judicial review.244
This seems to be the Government’s delivering on its manifesto
commitment in December 2019.245 How the review proceeds,
and its recommendations, could have tremendous implications
for the court’s powers. The fact that the UK, like the rest of the
world, is grappling with issues stemming from COVID-19 and a
recession, means any reforms might be reactive or may fly under
the radar and not receive the attention they deserve.246
Both courts face an uncertain future in which their roles in
their constitutional systems will come under intense scrutiny
and pressure. The tension between the rule of law, often seen as
the preserve of the judicial branches of government, and the
sovereignty of the elected branches is palpable. In a time of the
“strong man,” allegedly “populist leaders” who seemingly are
pushing the limits of the rule of law, the breakdown of
collaboration and debate, and the ever-present influence of
social media, this tension will only become more acute. The UK
and the US Supreme Courts must tread a delicate line between
the preserving the rule of law and usurping the role of elected
representatives. How the Supreme Court in Washington and
the Supreme Court in London address these challenges will
have a tremendous impact on their respective futures.

244. See Government Launches Independent Panel to Look at Judicial
Review, MINISTRY OF JUST., (July 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/C9ED-SMDJ.
245. See supra Part I.
246. Although generally supportive of the government’s purported reforms
and the need to rein in the power of the UK Supreme Court, it is the authors’
hope that this paper, and the wider academic and legal community, help
ensure that these reforms are fully debated and scrutinized before being
enacted.

